Functionalism is an aspect,
discipline, or belief system in philosophy which allows for mental states to be
separated and treated singularly according to what they are doing or
causing. This is coming from the
viewpoint that it is more significant to be recognised for what you do rather
than what you are internally, mentally speaking. Put another way, actions speak louder than
words. This belief structure,
functionalism, allows for a rectification between identity theory and
behaviourism, and creates a way to define mental states and their reactions by
the relationship to input and output in relation to the mental state that is
currently occupied.
There is, however, some
argument against the logic of functionalism.
One such argument is provided by Block via his Homunculi-Headed Robots
example. In his Troubles with Functionalism, Block lays out the scenario of his
argument, by suggesting that a body similar to a human should be imagined. The difference, though, is that instead of
having a normal mind, this body has many little people in it, who are tasked
with certain specific goals or objectives.
For example, person A needs to
pull switch 1 when they see a green light, triggering reaction Z, and that’s it. Each little person is responsible for a
specific action given a specific input.[1] Block then goes on to explain that if the
example of the little men in a body didn’t get the point across, imagine an
entire country, China,
as having this setup. Each person in China was
responsible for one action given one input.
This, Block says, would result in the entire country functioning as a
certain person[2] whilst ever that system
was in place, thus giving the impression that China,
as a whole, possessed mental states, even though China is not a living being.[3]
Block states that his
Homunculi-Headed Robots embarrass all versions of functionalism by indicating
that functionalism if guilty of liberalism, or the classification of systems
that lack mentality as having mentality.[4] It is important to understanding why Block is
raising this argument and making this point in the first place, to have a
knowledge of other theories and beliefs in philosophy. A precursor to functionalism is behaviourism,
which believes that there is not an input then a reaction due to the input, but
rather that there is a certain mental state which provides a disposition to
reacting a certain way. This can be seen
as a liberal or casual viewpoint.
Armstrong believes that it is the brain-state that determines the
mental-state and the state of the consciousness totally.[5] This again harkens back to the vague characterisation
of functionalism that Block mentioned, which is that each type of mental state
is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways and to have
certain mental states dependant upon the sensory inputs that are provided
during those certain mental states, and therefore shows that functionalism is
just a newer incarnation of behaviourism.[6]
Another aspect of the
functionalist point of view can be compared to that of dualism, both physical
and property. Armstrong believes that
mental states are not just determined by the corresponding states of the brain,
but that they are identical with the brain-states and involve nothing but
physical properties.[7] Another way of looking at dualism is through
opposites such as limit and limitlessness, self and other, one and many. These
ideas of duality have even gone beyond just the philosophical world and have
been used and applied in modern science.
Erwin Schrodinger is a modern physicist who explored a similar concept
to that in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness
in relation to quantum physics and temporal mechanics.[8] From the point of view that there are
different realities for any given object that is dependant upon the observed or
unobserved state of that object, Schrodinger theorised an experiment. Schrodinger postulated that if a cat was
locked in a box with a decaying isotope which was to release a poison upon its
decay, the cat at the instant of the poison being released, would both be dead
and alive whilst it was unobserved; yet the moment that something observed the
cat, it would be the influence of that observation that would dictate the
fortune or demise of the cat[9]. This embraces physical dualism, but also
shows facets of functionality, in that the cat will react to the observation by
either staying alive or becoming dead.
The observation then is an external input and the cat will react
accordingly with its current state. The duality state of multiple contradictory
possibilities co-existing at the same time for the same object or person has existed
as a philosophical concept since the time of the Pythagorean philosophers. Indeed, Plato talked about these ideas when
he said “…and the ancients, who were superior to us and dwelt nearer to the
Gods, have handed down a tradition that all things that are said to exist
consist of a One and a Many and contain in themselves the connate principles of
Limit and Unlimitedness.”[10]
What,
then, does this mean for the validity of Blocks argument, if anything? Dualism is generally regarded as being quite
comfortable and compatible with functionalism, and indeed as stated above,
lends itself quite nicely to the reaction from input model that is
functionalism. But it also lends
credence to behaviourism. As pointed out
by Armstrong, purposes are characterised by the outcomes that they
produce. I.e., if someone wanted to get
something to eat, they would get up and go to the kitchen or a restaurant, not
go to the bedroom and lie down. This is
encouraging for the behaviourism school of thought.[11] By being encouraging for behaviourism though,
it is also in a way encouraging for functionalism, since as previously stated
functionalism appears to be a rehashing or renewing of behaviourism. It is at this point that functionalism and
behaviourism should be recognised as different way of making the same argument,
and in essence are the same. Operating
under this premise, the correctness and validity of Block’s Homunculi-headed
Robots can be brought into light.
As
critics of behaviourism have pointed out before, the desire in a person for a
certain goal (x) cannot be identified solely with a disposition to do action
(z) when the person is unaware that performing action (z) will lead to goal
(x), thus meaning that they are not disposed to perform (z).[12] This means that certain paths of action or
reactions, according to behaviourism, will not happen without the subject
knowing this information. This is when the
accusation of behaviourism being guilty of liberalism by functionalism is
important. Liberalism is ascribing mental
properties to things that do not have them, such as machines or group entities.[13] This is the premise for Blocks objection to
functionalism; that according to functionalism, and by way of using a machine
table, such as in his hypothetical Homunculi-Headed Robots, non-living entities
are able to have mental properties ascribed to them, and Block believes this to
prove that functionalism is inherently wrong.
The basis of functionality is that there are certain qualitative states present
in the entity confirming the mental states.
Block has provided through the Homunculi-Headed Robots, however,
reasonable doubt at first impression on the validity of functionalism. This Absent Qualia Argument, or the argument
that due to prima facie the Homunculi-Headed Robots could not have mentality
because someone has doubted it in the first instance.[14]
This
would appear to be a logical argument against functionalism, using itself,
behaviourism, aspects of dualism, and self-doubt against it. Any arguments for functionalism seem to come
from a behaviourism standpoint, and are most effective when a belief and
acceptance in functionalism is already in place. In the end, the use of the Homunculi-Headed
Robots to show a flaw in the logic of functionalism is well done, and Block
does have a good objection to functionalism.
Further, as Armstrong reminds us, “it has often been remarked by
philosophers and others that the realm of the mind is a shadowy one, and that
the nature of mental states is singularly elusive and hard to grasp.”[15]
Bibliography
Armstrong,
D. M. (2002). “The causal theory of the mind”, in Philosophy of Mind Classical and
Contemporary Readings. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Block,
N. (2002). “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Philosophy of Mind Classical and
Contemporary Readings. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Fidler, D., Guthrie, K.,
Taylor, T., & Fairbanks,
A. (1987). The
Pythagorean Sourcebook An Anthology of Ancient Writings Which Relate to
Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy.
Phanes Press.
Physicsworld. (2000).
http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2815 Accessed 10 April, 2012.
Sartre, J. (1956).
‘The Existence of Others: The Look’ (extract). Being
and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Philosophical Library, New York.
[2]
Whomever the input and output machine table was setup to mimic
[5]
Armstrong, The causal theory of the mind, p
81
[7]
Armstrong, The
causal theory of the mind, p 81
[8]
Sarte, The Existence of Others: The Look
[9]
Physicsworld http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2815
[10]
Plato, Philebus quoted in Fidler p 20
[11]
Armstrong,
The causal theory of the mind, p 82
[13]
Ibid, p 95
[14]
Ibid, p 97
[15]
Armstrong, The
causal theory of the mind, p 84
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